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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the size and adjustment pattern of the interest rate pass-through (IRPT) 
between the policy-controlled interest rate (MPR) and seven (7) retail interest rates (lending and 
deposit rates) in Nigeria. This study departs from previous studies on Nigeria in the sense that it 
takes account of the effects of structural breaks in our modelling approach. First, we confirm the 
existence of long-run relationships between MPR and two retail rates (prime lending rate and 
savings deposit rate), albeit with significant structural breaks occurring in their cointegrating 
vectors at different periods. Second, we find evidence of incomplete pass-through in the 
response of the retail rates to MPR shocks. Third, most of the retail interest rates adjust 
symmetrically to changes in the policy rate, with the exception of the savings rate. This implies 
that the response of savings rate varies depending on whether the innovation in the MPR is 
positive or negative. Fourth, positive innovations in the MPR are fully reflected in the savings rate 
within 2 months as against 8 months for negative MPR shocks. Fifth, innovations in the MPR are 
fully transmitted to the prime lending rate in about 14 months while the complete pass-through 
to the 6-month time deposit rate occurs in about 11 months. In view of these findings, we 
recommend that the monetary authority should always have an eye on the size of the pass-
through as well as the heterogeneities found in the adjustment process of the retail rates while 
taking decisions on its policy rate. Also, the low IRPT obtained suggests a stronger monetary 
policy stance or other supplementary measures if the objectives of MPR changes are to be fully 
realized.  
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1.0 Introduction  
The interest rate channel of monetary policy describes the process by which changes in 
short-term policy interest rate of the central bank affect the overall economy via 
changes in the commercial banks’ retail interest rates. Thus, short-term policy interest 
rate has been recognized as a useful operating instrument of monetary policy, 
especially amongst inflation targeting countries. This is premised on the tenets of the 
new consensus macroeconomics, which believes in the potency of short-term interest 
rate in achieving price stability (Arestis, 2007). However, the continued use of short-term 
interest rates as a monetary policy tool by central banks rests strongly on the belief that 
there exists a significant and swift interest rate pass-through in the economy. Interest 
rate pass-through (IRPT) refers to the degree and speed of adjustment of retail interest 
rates to changes in the monetary authority’s policy rate (Aydin, 2007). The consensus 
amongst policy makers is that effective monetary policies are associated with changes 
in the policy rates that are fully transmitted to the retail interest rates (that is, complete 
pass-through) within a reasonably short period of time (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; 
Ahmad et al. 2013).  
In the literature, the results have been mixed with regard to the extent and speed of 
IRPT. Most studies (especially in developed countries) suggest that interest rate pass-
through has been both small in degree and slow in adjustment in response to changes 
in the official rate (Heffernan, 1993; Sanusi, 2010; Yildirim, 2012, Petrevski and Bogoev, 
2012; Ahmad et al, 2013; Ogundipe and Alege, 2013) while others have documented a 
high and quick IRPT (e.g. Karahan, 2014; Yuksel and Ozcan, 2013). Significant 
heterogeneities have also been found in the degree and speed of IRPT in lending rates 
across different sectors and deposit rate across different maturities (Aydin, 2007). 
Another strand of literature investigates the issue of asymmetry in the IRPT (Yuksel and 
Ozcan, 2012).   
In Nigeria, the monetary policy rate (MPR) has emerged as a key monetary policy tool 
for the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). At its bi-monthly meetings, the Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC) of the CBN sits to set the MPR based on its judgment regarding the 
current state of the economy as well as its expected future path. The ultimate goal in 
this regard is to be able to influence prices and aggregate demand in the economy 
3 
 
using the policy rate. It therefore becomes increasingly important for policy makers to 
correctly understand the dynamics of IRPT for better monetary policy decisions or 
outcomes.  
For ease of exposition, the remainder of the paper is structured as follows; section 2 
discusses some stylized facts on interest rates movements in Nigeria and highlights the 
findings of previous studies on IRPT in Nigeria, section 3 outlines the data and 
econometric framework for the empirical analysis , section 4 presents and discusses the 
empirical results and section 5 concludes. 
2.0 Stylized Facts—Trends in Interest Rates and Findings on IRPT in Nigeria 
Chart 1 presents a time series plot of the monetary policy rate (mpr) and the maximum 
(mlr) and prime (plr) lending rates. The chart seems to suggest that movements in the 
mpr lead that of mlr and plr, as to be expected given that market operators do react to 
actions taken by policy makers3. Indeed, the general belief in the literature is that 
operators (or commercial banks) would ordinarily adjust one-for-one their retail interest 
rates in response to changes in policy rate. In practice, however, such expectation is 
not often observed, as commercial banks tend to adjust their retail rates in response to 
changes in policy rates with some lags (or delays) thereby constituting an impediment 
to the ability of the central bank to guide the economy to the desired direction. A 
number of reasons have been advanced to explain why commercial banks retail rates 
tend to be somewhat sticky, namely credit rationing and adverse selction, switching 
costs, risk sharing, consumer irrationality, structure of the financial system, state of 
financial sector development, menu costs and information asymmetry.  
From Chart 1, while the rates experienced a gradual and steady downward trend 
between 2002 and 2008, the trend reversed towards the end of 2009 as there were 
increases in the retail rates during the global financial crisis, even though the mpr was 
lowered. The sharp movements in the rates between 2009 and early 2011 suggest the 
possibility of structural breaks in the relationships between the mpr and each of the 
lending rates.  
                                                          
3 The monetary policy rate (MPR) was introduced in December 2006 to replace the erstwhile minimum rediscount rate 
(MRR), which had used as a key short-term interest rate of the Central Bank of Nigeria, to signal the stance of monetary 
policy and provide general direction on interest rate movements. The MPR is set as the mid-point of the standing lending 
facility (SLF) and the standing deposit facility (SDF) window rates. 
4 
 
   Chart 1: Time Series Plot of Monetary Policy, Maximum Lending, and Prime Lending 
Rates, 2002 - 2014 
 
Source: CBN Statistics Database 
In chart 2, where we have plotted the mpr along with five categories of deposit rates, 
such sharp and large movements were also witnessed during the period of the global 
financial crisis. While the movements in the retail rates seem to reflect developments in 
the policy rate, the exact relationship as well as the degree of pass-through cannot be 
determined by examining Charts 1 and 2.   
The correlation matrix between the mpr (contemporaneous and lagged up to 12 lags) 
and the contemporaneous lending and deposit rates in Table 1, shows that there is a 
positive correlation between mpr and the two lending rates—mlr and plr, and between 
the mpr and the five deposit rates used in the study. It is evident from the table that the 
correlation is not perfect, as the correlation coefficients were generally less than one. 
The correlation coefficients for all the retail interest rates (except the mlr) tended to 
increase with increasing lags of mpr peaking at some lags along the lag chain. This may 
suggest a possible lag response of commercial banks to monetary policy shocks.  
The correlation coefficient peaked at 0.43 (contemporaneously) for the maximum 
lending rate (mlr) and declined steadily thereafter for lagged mpr until lags 10-12 when 
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it actually turned negative. For the prime lending rate the contemporaneous 
correlation coefficient is 0.66, which rose steadily to peak at approximately 0.67 from 
lag 3 to lag 8 before declining marginally to 0.66 from lag 9 to lag 12 but remained in 
the positive zone all through. The correlation analysis between the mpr and the lending 
rates casts some doubts as to whether commercial banks’ actually pay attention to the 
mpr in fixing their maximum lending rates with the recorded low and declining 
correlation coefficient.  
Chart 2: Time Series Plot of Monetary Policy and selected Deposit Rates in Nigeria, 
2002 - 2014 
 
Source: CBN Statistics Database 
In the case of deposit rates the correlation coefficients are positive contemporaneously 
and at all lagged mpr considered in the analysis; they are generally 0.55 or higher. The 
correlation coefficient for the savings deposit rate (sr) peaked at 0.81 at mpr(-12), 0.67 
for the 1-month time deposit rate (tdr1) at mpr(-10), 0.69 for the 3-month time deposit 
rate (tdr3) at mpr(-10), 0.65 for the 6-month time deposit rate (tdr6) at mpr(-7) and 
approximately 0.61 for 12-month time deposit rate (tdr12) at mpr(-2 to -8). While it is not 
advisable to read much meaning into these numbers, the moderate correlation 
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coefficients could be an indication that the pass-through from policy rate to retail rates 
might be low/non-existent and incomplete in Nigeria while the pattern of lagged 
correlation may point to a very slow speed of adjustment on the part of commercial 
banks. Be that as it may, there is, however, need for a more rigorous empirical analysis 
to facilitate meaningful conclusions on the nature of IRPT in Nigeria. 
Table 1: Correlation Matrix-Monetary Policy Rate vis-à-vis Lending and Deposit Rates 
mpr mpr(-1) mpr(-2) mpr(-3) mpr(-4) mpr(-5) mpr(-6) mpr(-7) mpr(-8) mpr(-9) mpr(-10) mpr(-11) mpr(-12)
mlr 0.4274 0.4005 0.3699 0.3409 0.3048 0.2645 0.2185 0.1604 0.1011 0.0330 -0.0304 -0.0784 -0.1258
plr 0.6554 0.6583 0.6635 0.6684 0.6702 0.6697 0.6660 0.6661 0.6651 0.6638 0.6607 0.6590 0.6554
sr 0.5509 0.5737 0.6007 0.6058 0.6308 0.6691 0.6941 0.7157 0.7405 0.7589 0.7778 0.7950 0.8093
tdr1 0.5651 0.5856 0.6012 0.6067 0.6205 0.6344 0.6437 0.6537 0.6592 0.6608 0.6664 0.6624 0.6525
tdr3 0.6201 0.6337 0.6451 0.6496 0.6563 0.6658 0.6732 0.6798 0.6815 0.6837 0.6871 0.6801 0.6706
tdr6 0.5913 0.6042 0.6175 0.6223 0.6260 0.6355 0.6453 0.6518 0.6509 0.6473 0.6440 0.6292 0.6128
tdr12 0.5862 0.5968 0.6092 0.6090 0.6065 0.6062 0.6084 0.6125 0.6054 0.5948 0.5950 0.5799 0.5665
Source: Authors' Computation.
mpr = Monetary Policy Rate (or Minimum Rediscount Rate (MMR))
mlr = Maximum Lending Rate
plr = Prime Lending Rate
sr = Savings Deposit Rate
tdr1 = One-Month Time Deposit Rate
tdr3 = Three-Month Time Deposit Rate
tdr6 = Six-Month Time Deposit Rate
tdr12 = Twelve-Month Time Deposit Rate  
The literature on IRPT is vast, particularly for developed countries while for emerging and 
developing countries, the literature is growing. In sub-Saharan African countries, 
including Nigeria, where most of the countries have implemented series of reforms, 
limited attention has been paid to analyzing interest rate pass-through notwithstanding 
its prominent role in the monetary policy transmission process.  To the best of our 
knowledge, studies of IRPT in Nigeria are fairly recent and limited (Haruna (2010); Sanusi, 
2010; Bangura (2011); Fomum (2011); Mangwengwende (2011); Mangwengwende et 
al. (2011); Ogundipe and Alege, 2013); Mustapha et al. (2013); and Kelilume (2014)).4 All 
the authors found an incomplete and slow IRPT.  
Sanusi (2010) estimated the magnitude and speed of the interest rate pass-through for 
Nigeria using monthly data for the period 2002-2010 and a structural vector auto-
regression (SVAR) model to derive the dynamic elasticities of the pass-through of 
monetary policy rate and interbank interest rates to the retail lending and deposit 
                                                          
4 Haruna (2010) did not carry out any empirical analysis and as at the time of writing an update has not been seen 
anywhere. The paper merely indicated that a VAR technique along with a symmetric and an asymmetric error 
correction modelling technique would be used for the analyses.  
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interest rates. He found that interest rate pass-through in Nigeria is incomplete and quite 
slow. His results also show that the pass-through of monetary policy rate to interbank 
money market rates is substantially larger and faster than they are for the retail lending 
and deposit rates. He argued that the banking and financial sector reforms 
implemented over the years have failed to remove the distortions in the retail loans and 
deposit markets and added that such distortions in the retail loans and deposit market 
would continue to render monetary policy ineffective and inefficient in the country.  
Bangura (2011) use monthly data spanning the period 1989:01-2009:12 to analyze the 
similarities or otherwise between interest rate pass-through in four Anglophone West 
African countries within the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) including Nigeria. The 
study explored the interest rate adjustment dynamics using the discount rate, treasury 
bill rate, commercial banks’ deposit and lending rates in all the countries studied. It set 
out to specifically examine how lending and deposit rates respond to changes in the 
official rates and to establish whether there is a convergence among the rates over 
time and the relative adjustment of lending rates to changes in the official rate when 
there is a disequilibrium. Full sample period and a rolling window analysis were 
conducted while the cointegration technique and an asymmetric error model to derive 
the short-run and long-run parameters from which the error correction coefficients, 
mean adjustment lags and asymmetric mean adjustment lags were estimated. For 
Nigeria, the main findings are: the long-run pass-through is 0.81 for the lending rate and 
0.67 for the deposit rate while the short-run pass-through is 0.66 and 0.47, respectively, 
using the full sample; the pass-through estimates in the case of rolling windows analysis 
were mixed both in the short-run and long-run—ranging from 0.13 to 1.10 for the long-
run and -0.04 to 1.08 for the short-run lending rate and -0.03 to 1.18  and -0.08 to 0.78, 
respectively, for the long-run and short-run deposit rates; the mean adjustment lags 
suggest speed of adjustment of the lending rate for the full sample is two for deposit 
rates it is seven; the average speeds of adjustment for the rolling windows are four and 
five months, respectively, for lending and deposit rates; there are asymmetries in 
deposit rates and downward rigidity in both lending and deposit rates in Nigeria based 
on the full sample; and in the case of rolling windows, mixed results were obtained. 
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Fomum (2011) performed a comparative analysis of interest rate pass-through in 
Cameroon and Nigeria using retail rates (lending and deposit) and a discount rate 
(policy rate) for the spanning January 1990 through December 2010. Specifically, the 
study analyzed the magnitude and speed of retail rate adjustments to changes in the 
central bank policy rate and examined whether there is symmetric or asymmetric pass-
through in addition to investigating if there is pass-through transmission from one country 
to the other. According to the author, four varieties of cointegrating techniques 
(system-based Johansen-Juselius (JJ), and single equation-based Engle-Granger (EG), 
cointegration regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) and ECM-based) were used to test for 
the presence of a cointegrating long-run relationship between the policy rate and the 
retail rates to guarantee the robustness of the relationship identified. In addition, 
following the work of Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), three sets of analyses were 
undertaken: first, to analyze pass-through for the entire sample, second, to analyze 
symmetric and asymmetric pass-through using a ten year rolling window analysis in an 
error correction framework, and third, the policy rates were swapped to investigate any 
transmission of impulses from one country to another. For Nigeria, some of the key 
findings include: cointegrating relationship was confirmed for the lending rate by the 
EG, CRDW and ECM tests and by EG and ECM for the deposit rate; short-run pass-
through coefficients are 0.71 for lending rate and 0.50 for deposit rate, but overall 
sluggish; long-run pass-through are almost similar at 0.72 and 0.70, respectively for the 
lending and deposit rates suggesting a sluggish and incomplete pass-through; pass-
through mechanism is symmetric for both the lending and deposit rates; the mean 
adjustment lag is 4.9 months for lending rates and 7 months for deposit rate; asymmetric 
adjustment was confirmed in six rolling windows for lending rate in Nigeria of which 
three indicated that the direction of rigidity is downward supporting the collusive 
pricing arrangement between banks (Scholnick, 1996) and the other three suggested 
rigidity in the upward direction confirming the customer reaction hypothesis (Scholnick, 
1996); monetary policy are highly effective in Nigeria compared to Cameroon; and 
policy rate in Nigeria exerts some influence on the deposit rate in Cameroon. 
Mangwengwende (2011) and Mangwengwende et al. (2011) investigated the 
relationship between bank concentration and interest rate pass-through in four Sub-
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Saharan African countries namely Botswana, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia.5 Similar 
to the study by Fomum (2011), both studies employed both the JJ and the EG 
(encompassing the residual-based, CRDW and ECM) techniques to test for 
cointegration among the policy rate and lending and deposit rates in these countries. 
Rolling windows analyses were also carried out in addition to tests for symmetric and 
asymmetric adjustments in the pass-through. The major findings with respect to Nigeria 
are: cointegration is confirmed for the deposit and lending rates by only two of the 
testing techniques employed; the rolling window analysis confirmed cointegration with 
the policy rate for all deposit rates but in the case of lending rates the results are mixed; 
symmetric error correction for both lending and deposit rates is significant and lending 
rates adjust faster than deposit rates; asymmetric results were also significant for deposit 
rates, and adjustments downward were slower than deposit rate adjustment upward, 
providing support for adverse consumer reaction hypothesis; and overall, pass-through 
is largely low and sluggish (incomplete). 
Ogundipe and Alege (2013) investigated interest rate pass-through in Nigeria using 
both the system-based Johansen-Juselius (JJ) and the single equation Engle-Granger 
(EG) two-step cointegration procedures with annual data for the period 1970-2011. 
Using the VAR-based error correction model (ECM) and the mean adjustment lag 
(MAL), the authors determined the short run estimates and the asymmetric behaviour, 
respectively. They found evidence of downward stickiness both in the short-run and 
long run policy rate pass-through to the retail bank rates. For robustness, the authors 
conducted impulse response and variance decomposition analyses and obtained 
similar slow and sluggish (incomplete) pass-through.6  
Mustapha et al. (2013) focused only on the lending rate pass-through from policy to 
retail interest rates in their study within the framework of the Taylor principle and came 
to a similar conclusion that the pass-through is incomplete in Nigeria during the period 
covered by the study. This, according to them, contradicts the Taylor principle and has 
                                                          
5 Mangwengwende et al. (2011) is actually based on the work of Mangwengwende (2011). 
 
6 Although, Ogundipe and Alege (2013) made an effort to examine the issue of asymmetry in interest rate 
pass-through in Nigeria, as per Table 3, p. 28 of their paper, they failed to analyse or interpret their results. 
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implications for the stabilizing role of monetary policy and the oscillations arising from 
price and liquidity shocks. 
Kililume (2014) examined the effects of monetary policy rate on interest rates in Nigeria 
using monthly data from January 2007 to September 2012 and a multivariate vector 
autoregressive model. The interest rate variables employed for the empirical analysis 
include the monetary policy rate (mpr) and five retail interest rates variables–savings 
deposit rate (sdr), interbank rates (ibr), prime lending rate (plr), maximum lending rate 
(mlr) and long term interest rates in the 91-day treasury bill rate (tbr). The key findings 
from the study are: the pass-through of mpr to short-term and long term retail rates in 
Nigeria is sticky; the only indication of the effectiveness of monetary policy is seen only 
in the relationship between the mpr and interbank rates; there is a weak relationship 
between mpr and retail rates in Nigeria; and overall, there is weak interest rate pass-
through in Nigeria. 
Even though these studies covered the period of the global financial crisis and spanned 
a fairly long period of time, they failed to account for structural breaks in their modeling 
approach7. This study attempts to fill this gap. Thus, the main objective of this study is to 
investigate interest rate pass-through from the policy rate to selected retail interest rates 
in Nigeria while accommodating asymmetric adjustments and structural breaks in our 
modeling approach. Specifically, we estimate the degree of IRPT to different retail rates 
in Nigeria and their speeds of adjustment to innovations in the policy rate. Also, we 
investigate whether there is evidence of asymmetry and heterogeneities in the 
adjustment process of the rates. The achievement of these objectives has significant 
policy relevance as it would help to improve the design and execution of effective 
monetary policy in Nigeria. 
3.0 Data and Methodology 
Unlike previous Nigerian studies, we estimated an asymmetric error correction model 
that accounts for endogenously determined structural breaks in the cointegrating 
equation for the IRPT. The first step in the estimation approach involved testing for 
stationarity in our variables, after which bivariate cointegration tests were conducted 
                                                          
7 This could lead to parameter bias and wrong estimates for the degree of interest rate pass-through. 
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between the policy rate and the different retail rates being considered. The single 
equation approach to cointegration and error correction of Engle and Granger (1987) 
and Gregory and Hansen (1996) are employed. The Neumark and Sharpe (1992) 
approach to understanding asymmetric adjustment processes is employed and the 
adjustment mean lag is computed as proposed by Doornik and Hendry (1994) and 
adopted by Scholnick (1996).  
3.1 Data 
The study utilizes monthly data on the monetary policy rate (mpr) and seven retail rates, 
which are: maximum lending rate (mlr), prime lending Rate (plr), savings rate (sr), 1-
month time deposit rate (tdr1), 3-month time deposit rate (tdr3), 6-month time deposit 
rate (tdr6) and 12-month time deposit rate (tdr12). All the data were sourced from the 
Statistics Database of the Central Bank of Nigeria. The sample period spans 2002:01 to 
2014:12. 
3.2 Model  
The basic equation for analyzing IRPT is the marginal cost pricing model of the form: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                      (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the different retail interest rates set by commercial banks at time t (which 
includes mlr, plr, sr, tdr1, tdr3, tdr6, tdr12), 𝑥𝑡 represents the policy rate (mpr), 𝛼𝑖 is a mark 
up for the different retail interest rates, 𝛽𝑖 captures the extent of long-run IRPT for each 
of the retail rates, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the residuals from the different retail interest rate equations. 
βi<1 indicates incomplete pass-through, βi=1 implies complete pass-through and βi>1 
denotes an over pass-through. 
3.3 Estimation Procedure 
The econometric procedure adopted follows the work of Scholnick (1996). However, 
the only area of departure is in the procedure for the cointegration test. While Scholnick 
adopted the Johansen technique, we chose the Gregory and Hansen (1996) residual-
based approach in order to account for structural breaks in the cointegrating 
relationship. Engle and Granger (1987) approach to testing for cointegration tends to 
under-reject the null of no cointegration if there is a  cointegration relationship that has 
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changed at some (unknown) time during the sample period, implying low power (Harris 
and Sollis, 2003). Gregory and Hansen (1996) developed four different models to test for 
cointegration with structural beaks. These are models with: (i) level shift, C (GH-1); (ii) 
level shift with trend, C/T (GH-2); (iii) intercept and slope shifts, C/S (GH-3); and (iv) 
intercept, slope and trend shifts, C/S/T (GH-4). The inferred Gregory and Hansen 
equations for the IRPT equations are specified respectively as: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖1 + 𝛼𝑖2𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                   (2) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =   𝛼𝑖1 + 𝛼𝑖2𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                       (3) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =   𝛼𝑖1 + 𝛼𝑖2𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖2𝑥𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                              (4) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖1 + 𝛼𝑖2𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖2𝑥𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                  (5) 
where yit, 𝛼𝑖1, xt, 𝛽𝑖 and 𝜺𝒊𝒕 are as earlier defined. t is a time trend, parameters 𝛼𝑖1 and 𝛼𝑖2are the respective intercept terms before and after the break, 𝜑 is the coefficient for 
time trend, 𝛽1and 𝛽2 are the respective pass-through coefficients of the retail interest 
rates before and after the structural break. The variables yt and xt are expected to be 
I(1) while 𝜀𝑖𝑡 should be I(0). Dt is a dummy variable of the form: 
𝐷𝑡 =  {0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ≤ [𝑇𝜏]1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 > [𝑇𝜏]                                                              
where the unknown relative timing of the break date is denoted as 𝜏 ∈ 𝐽,  [:] denotes 
the integer part operator and J is the trimming region belonging to a compact set of 
(0,1).8 Gregory and Hansen (1996) proposed the test for cointegration with an unknown 
break date, which involves computing the usual statistics (ADF and Philips-Perron test 
statistics) for each possible break point 𝜏 ∈ 𝐽 and then selecting the smallest value (the 
largest negative value) obtained across all possible break points, since this will 
potentially present greater evidence against the null hypothesis of no cointegration. In 
this regard, the relevant statistics are the GH-ADF (𝜏), GH-𝑍𝛼(𝜏) and GH-𝑍𝑡(𝜏). Of 
                                                          
8 Gregory and Hansen (1996) consistent with the earlier literature proposed J = (0.15, 0.85). This implies that 
the grid search for the appropriate break date should take place within the interval of 70% of the series of 
interest. 
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equations (2) to (5), the model that provides the best fit to the data is selected based 
on AIC.  
After testing for cointegration, we estimate symmetric error correction model for each 
of the retail interest rates as follows: ∆y𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 ∆𝑋𝑡−𝑖𝑠𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 ∆𝑌𝑡−𝑗𝑞𝑗=1 + 𝜌𝜀𝑡−1  + 𝜇𝑡                (6) where 𝜌 measures the speed of adjustment, 𝜀𝑡−1 is the one period lag of the residuals 
from the appropriate Gregory-Hansen long run specification selected based on AIC, 
which has taken care of the bias from possible misspecification error due to structural 
breaks.  
Lastly, the possibility of asymmetric adjustment process is investigated based on the 
approach adopted by Scholnick (1996). This involves partitioning the residuals from the 
appropriate Gregory-Hansen long run specification into two parts, namely 𝜀𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 and 𝜀𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  depending on whether 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is below or above its long run average at each 
period.9 Thus, the residuals 𝜀𝑡 are divided as follows: 𝜀𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 =  𝜀𝑡 ,       𝑖𝑓 𝜀𝑡 >  𝜇 𝜀𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 =  0,       𝑖𝑓 𝜀𝑡 <  𝜇 
and 𝜀𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 =  𝜀𝑡 ,       𝑖𝑓 𝜀𝑡 <  𝜇 𝜀𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 =  0,       𝑖𝑓 𝜀𝑡 >  𝜇 
where 𝜇 is the mean of 𝜀𝑡. We then proceed to estimate an asymmetric short run 
dynamic equation of the form: 
∆y𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 ∆𝑋𝑡−𝑖𝑠𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 ∆𝑌𝑡−𝑗𝑞𝑗=1 + 𝜌1𝜀𝑡−1𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 +  𝜌2𝜀𝑡−1𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝜇𝑡              (7)                    
                                                          
9 Scholnick (1996) has observed that such partitioning will not affect the estimation of ε or the cointegrating 
vector. A related procedure advanced by Chan (1993) is to sort the series ԑ in ascending order ranging 
from the smallest to the largest value regardless of time. 
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where 𝜌1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜌2 are adjustment coefficients when the residuals is above and below its 
mean, respectively. A test for asymmetric adjustment is conducted by testing the 
restriction that the two error correction coefficients in equation (7) are equal (that is 
testing the null hypothesis, Ho: 𝜌1 = 𝜌2). If the Wald test shows that they are equal, then, 
there is no evidence of asymmetry. The procedure for calculating the span of time 
required for the retail rates to converge to their long run equilibrium, regarded as the 
mean adjustment lags (MAL) was proposed by Doornik and Hendry (1994) as follows: 𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 =  (1 − 𝛽𝑖) 𝜌1⁄                                                                  (8) 𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 =  (1 − 𝛽𝑖) 𝜌2⁄                                                                 (9) 
where 𝛽𝑖is the estimated short run interest rate pass-through coefficient and 𝜌1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜌2 
are the corresponding error correction coefficients in equation (7). A high MAL implies 
slow adjustment of the retail rates to mpr changes while a low MAL indicates a quick 
adjustment.10  
4.0 Results 
In this section, we present our findings regarding the existence of a long relationship 
between the policy rate (mpr) and each of the retail rates (mlr, plr, sr, tdr1, tdr3, tdr6, 
tdr12). The long run interest rate pass-through coefficients are estimated for the retail 
rates that are cointegrated with the policy rate and the results of their short run 
dynamics are presented. The results of the tests regarding the nature and speed of the 
adjustments of the retail rates to changes in the policy rates are also presented.  
4.1 Stationarity Test Results 
The order of integration of the variables is investigated using the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron tests. At the one per cent significance level, the tests 
results showed that the mpr, mlr, plr, sr, tdr1, tdr3, tdr6 and tdr12 are integrated of order 
1 and could be differenced once to attain stationarity (Table 2). This implies that the 
Engle Granger cointegration and error correction approach can be applied to 
                                                          
10 Another plausible way of testing for no asymmetry is to use the Wald test with a 
2 (1) distribution to test the 
restriction that (8) is equal to (9). 
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investigate the long and short run relationships between the mpr and each of the retail 
rates. 
Table 2: Unit Root Test Results 
 
4.2 Cointegration Test Results 
In order to investigate the existence of long run relationships between the monetary 
policy rate (mpr) and each of the retail rates, we test for cointegration using both the 
Engle and Granger and the Gregory-Hansen residual-based cointegration tests. The 
results of the Engle and Granger residual based test presented in Table 3 showed that 
at the 5 per cent significance level, the mpr is cointegrated with sr and tdr6.  
Table 3: Engle and Granger Cointegration Test Results 
 
However, the test failed to find any long run relationship between the mpr and each of 
the remaining five retail interest rate variables. Since the Engle and Granger (1987) 
approach to testing for cointegration has been known to possess low power in the 
presence of structural breaks (Harris and Sollis, 2003), we proceed to employ the 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) approach and the results are presented in Table 4.  
ADFc PPc ADFc PPc
mpr -2.4278 -2.4218 -12.1025 -12.1212 I(1)
mlr -2.5159 -2.4639 -13.3880 -13.3626 I(1)
plr -3.2167 -3.1127 -10.2495 -10.1123 I(1)
sr -1.9736 -3.7217 -11.0915 -30.6821 I(1)
tdr1 -2.1659 -2.2714 -6.5503 -14.4842 I(1)
tdr3 -2.4800 -2.4412 -14.8249 -14.6712 I(1)
tdr6 -2.8478 -2.6398 -12.4350 -14.8679 I(1)
tdr12 -3.0288 -2.8493 -12.6752 -19.1925 I(1)
ADF c  and PP c  represent unit root test with constant 
*MacKinnon (1996) critical values with constant  are -3.4731 (1%), -2.8802 (5%) and -2.5768 (10%)
Variable
Levels First Difference
Decision
Model t-Statistic P-value
mlr -1.7594 0.3995
plr -2.2585 0.1869
sr -5.3686 0.0000
tdr1 -1.8884 0.3371
tdr3 -2.3881 0.1468
tdr6 -2.9413 0.0430
tdr12 -2.3600 0.1549
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Table 4: Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Test Results 
 
The Gregory-Hansen cointegration test results corroborated the Engle-Granger 
cointegration test, confirming the existence of a long run relationship between the mpr 
and sr, but with a significant structural break in June 2010, December 2012 and July 
2010 for Model C, Model C/T and Model C/S. respectively. However, while the Engle-
Granger results failed to find cointegration between the mpr and plr, the Gregory-
Hansen approach confirmed the existence of a cointegrating relationship which 
changed in January 2008 and August 2007 for Model C/T and Model C/S, respectively.  
There was, however, no evidence of cointegration between the policy rate and the 
other retail rates. The effects of the identified structural breaks were therefore 
accommodated in the error correction models estimated for plr and sr.    
GH-1 Regression GH-2 Regression GH-3 Regression
(Intercept Shift)  (Intercept Shift with Trend)  (Intercept & Slope Shifts)
GH Test Statistic (ADF) -4.6852 -4.6990 -4.3216
Break Date 2008M02 2008M02 2007M11
AIC 4.9825 4.9287 4.9365
GH Test Statistic (ADF) -3.4651 -5.1922** -5.5163**
Break Date 2003M12 2008M01 2007M08
AIC 4.1182 4.0224 4.1472
GH Test Statistic (Zα) -76.7629** -86.9217** -78.6141**
Break Date 2010M06 2012M12 2010M07
AIC 2.1670 2.6880 2.7155
GH Test Statistic (ADF) -3.8601 -3.7511 -3.8377
Break Date 2009M05 2011M02 2009M05
AIC 4.7394 4.4398 4.7718
GH Test Statistic (ADF) -3.6392 -3.9568 -3.9296
Break Date 2010M06 2010M06 2010M06
AIC 4.6672 4.3984 4.6991
GH Test Statistic (ADF) -3.9070 -4.5685 -4.3948
Break Date 2010M08 2010M06 2010M06
AIC 4.8823 4.6788 4.9136
GH Test Statistic (ADF) -3.3196 -3.5673 -3.4391
Break Date 2010M05 2010M05 2010M05
AIC 5.0107 4.8276 5.0387
The 5% critical values are -4.61, -4.99, -4.95 and -40.48, -47.96, 47.04 for the ADF*and Zα* tests, respectively (Table 1a of Gregory and Hansen, 1996)
PLR
MLR
StatisticModel
TDR12
TDR6
TDR3
TDR1
SR
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Overall, the Engle-Granger and Gregory-Hansen cointegration tests confirmed that the 
mpr is cointegrated with the pls, sr and tdr6. Consequently, we proceed to estimate the 
long run interest rate pass-through coefficients for the three retail rates. 
4.3 Long-run Pass-through Coefficients 
The estimated long-run pass-through coefficients for the three retail rates (plr, sr and 
td6) are significant and positive (Table 5). In the case of the prime lending rate (plr), the 
long–run coefficient of 0.25 implies an incomplete pass-through. In other words, banks’ 
lending rates react less proportionally to the policy rate, suggestive of the possibility of 
the banks perceiving their prime borrowers as being less risky. The results of the Wald test 
also suggested that the long-run pass-through coefficient is significantly different from 
unity (1). 
Table 5: Long-run Estimates of Pass-Through Coefficients
 
As with plr, the long-run pass-through coefficient for the savings rate (sr) is significantly 
less than unity, indicating an incomplete pass-through from mpr to sr. At 0.5593, the 
highest level of long-run pass-through was recorded for tdr6 even though it was also 
significantly different from unity, as revealed by the Wald test. These results imply an 
incomplete and slow pass-through, which seem to suggest that the interest rate 
channel of monetary policy in Nigeria is quite weak. These findings are broadly in line 
with the results obtained by all the earlier studies on IRPT in Nigeria. 
4.4 Short-run Coefficients and Asymmetric Adjustments 
Table 6 presents the results of the short run analysis of the relationship between the 
policy rate and the retail interest rates (plr, sr and tdr6). Of the three rates, only the 
savings rate (sr) recorded a significant short run pass-through coefficient. The error 
correction coefficients for the three models were highly significant and negative, 
providing further evidence of the existence of long run relationship between the mpr 
and the three variables. The sizes of the error correction coefficients seem to suggest a 
Rates Long-run pass-through coefficient Wald test: long-run coefficient=1
plr 0.2520*** -12.4257***
sr 0.1639*** -42.2735***
tdr6 0.5593*** -7.168***
*** indicates significance at 1 per cent level
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sluggish speed of convergence of the retail rates to their long run equilibrium. At 0.1693, 
the fastest speed of adjustment was recorded by sr, implying that about 16.9 per cent 
of the disequilibrium error is corrected within a month. Similarly, tdr6 and plr recorded 
adjustment speeds of 11.73 and 7.05 per cent per month, respectively. 
The results of the asymmetric version of the estimated single equation error correction 
model (ECM) showed the pattern of responses of the retail rates to positive and 
negative shocks to the monetary policy rate implemented by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria. The results presented in Table 6 indicated that plr and tdr6 do not adjust 
differently to equilibrium based on whether they are high or low relative to their 
equilibrium relationship with respect to the monetary policy rate. In other words, the two 
rates respond in the same way to both positive and negative innovations in the mpr. 
However, the null hypothesis that the coefficients ρ+ and ρ- are equal was rejected for 
sr, implying that there is short run asymmetry in the way banks adjust their savings rate to 
changes in the monetary policy rate.  
Furthermore, the estimated asymmetric coefficients showed that the savings rate (sr) 
adjust faster when they are high relative to their long-run equilibrium than when they 
are low. In other words, the speed of adjustment of the savings rate to increases in the 
mpr is faster when compared to the adjustment to decreases in the policy rate.  
Table 6: Short-run Estimates 
 
The results of the mean adjustment lag (MAL) statistics computed based on the 
estimated error correction models for the three retail rates are presented in Table 7. The 
MAL presents the duration within which the retail rates experience complete pass-
through. Based on the fact that monthly series are used for our study, the MAL shows 
Wald test: ρ +  = ρ -
β ρ ρ+ ρ - χ2   P-value
plr 0.0158 -0.0705*** -0.0949** -0.0281 0.7097 0.3995
sr -0.1131** -0.1693*** -0.4726*** 0.1113 17.6840 0.0000
tdr6 -0.2142 -0.1173*** -0.1186** -0.1155 0.0007 0.9783
** and *** indicate significance at 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, respectively
AsymmetricSymmetric
Variable
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the number of months required for the changes in the mpr to be fully transmitted to the 
retail rates. 
Table 7: Adjustment Mean Lag 
 
As noted earlier, the savings rate (sr) recorded the lowest asymmetric MAL implying that 
the fastest speed of adjustment occurs in the sr, compared to the other rates. The 
computed MAL for the response of sr to positive mpr shocks is about -1.88, implying that 
positive innovations in the mpr are fully reflected in the savings rate within two months. 
However, a negative shock to the mpr initiated by the CBN is fully reflected in the 
savings rate in about 8 months. 
The computed symmetric MAL for the plr and tdr6 are -13.96 and -10.35, respectively. 
These imply that innovations to the mpr implemented by the CBN are fully transmitted 
to the prime lending rate in about 14 months while the full pass-through to the 6-month 
time deposit rate takes place in about 11 months. 
5.0 Conclusion 
In this paper, we extended the Neumark and Sharpe (1992) approach to the study of 
interest rate pass-through by accommodating structural breaks in the cointegrating 
relationships between the monetary policy rate and each of the retail interest rates 
considered. The empirical analysis was conducted using monthly data spanning 
2002:01 to 2014:12. The cointegration tests based on Engle and Granger (1987) and 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) indicated that only three out of the seven retail rates 
considered were cointegrated with the policy rate. The Gregory and Hansen (1996) 
cointegration test with structural break confirmed that the regressions for plr and sr 
recorded structural breaks during January 2008/August 2007 and June/July 
2010/December 2012, respectively, depending on which of the Gregory-Hansen model 
is applicable. These periods coincided with the period of the last global financial crisis. 
Positive Negative
plr -13.9603 - -
sr -6.5747 -1.8766 7.9686
tdr6 -10.3512 - -
Asymmetric
SymmetricVariable
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The effects of the identified structural breaks were accordingly incorporated into the 
estimated error correction models for the qualifying retail interest rates (plr, sr and tdr6). 
For the three variables with which the mpr was cointegrated, we estimated the long run 
and short run interest rate pass-through and investigated their adjustment patterns to 
innovations in the policy rate implemented by the Central Bank of Nigeria. Apart from 
accounting for structural breaks in our modelling approach, we also allowed for 
possible asymmetries in the adjustment of each of the retail rates to its long run 
equilibrium. The results are quite revealing. 
First, we found evidence of incomplete pass-through in the long run coefficients of the 
cointegrating regressions for plr, sr and tdr6, implying a low and sluggish pass-through of 
changes in the mpr to the three rates. These findings are not different from the findings 
of earlier studies r carried out on Nigeria. Second, we found that the adjustment pattern 
of the plr and tdr6 to changes in the mpr were symmetric while that of sr was 
asymmetric. The implication of this is that the way banks adjust their savings rate 
depend on whether the change in the policy rate is that of an increase or a decrease. 
Third, the computed mean adjustment lag for the savings rate showed that its 
adjustment to positive innovations in the mpr is faster than that of a decrease in the 
mpr. We found that the effects of an increase in the mpr are fully reflected in the 
savings rate within 2 months. However, it takes about 8 months for the effects of a 
decline in the mpr to be fully transmitted to the savings rate. Fourth, we found that the 
adjustments of the plr and tdr6 to changes in the mpr were fully transmitted to the 
prime lending rate in about 14 months while that of the 6-month time deposit rate was 
about 11 months. 
 Overall, we found that the pass-through of the policy rate to the retail interest rates is 
incomplete and weak while the adjustment process is quite rigid, especially for the 
prime lending rate and the 6-month time deposit rate. It is recommended that the 
monetary authority factors in the size of the pass-through as well as the heterogeneities 
found in the adjustment process of the retail rates when taking decisions on its policy 
rate. The low IRPT obtained suggests that for desired policy outcomes to be realized, a 
stronger monetary policy stance may be required.  
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Indeed, the low and incomplete pass-through found in this study is hardly surprising 
given that the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission is weak in Nigeria. 
The results may have resulted from a mixture of several factors such as the less 
developed and not too well-functioning financial markets, financial markets 
imperfection (less competitive markets), oligopolistic nature of the financial system, high 
switching costs, fixed menu costs, and information asymmetric. More importantly, the 
strong presence of public sector dominance (government and its agencies) in the 
financial markets—both loans and deposits markets, may also have influenced the kind 
of results obtained. The low and incomplete pass-through recorded for some of the 
retail rates is suggestive of the fact that interest rates in Nigeria are not wholly 
influenced by the market but by other external factors. The absence of any 
cointegrating relationship between the mpr and most of the retail interest rates raises 
the question of the efficacy of monetary policy actions in Nigeria. In conclusion, there is 
need for a comprehensive review of the current monetary policy strategy in Nigeria 
complemented with the pursuit of further banking/financial sector reforms. 
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